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1
Charities may be aided in the 
perpetuation of their opacity by a public 
that seems unwilling to be freed from its 
ignorance. 
The Economist, November 13
th, 2010, 
page 68 
 
1. Introduction 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could contribute to international development cooperation 
in two ways. They may engage in activities and locations where official aid agencies have no access 
or where government-to-government transfers are unlikely to reach the poor. At the same time, 
NGOs may mobilize financial resources from private donors and, thereby, help scale up 
international aid efforts. The recent literature has focused on the first issue, in particular by 
analyzing whether the allocation of NGO aid across recipient countries differs from the allocation 
of official aid (e.g., Koch et al. 2009; Dreher et al. 2010). The second issue has attracted less 
attention, even though NGOs are widely considered to play an increasingly important role in 
supplementing official aid resources. For instance, McCleary and Barro (2008) report recent 
estimates according to which more than 40 percent of development aid by the United States is 
channeled through NGOs.
1  
It mainly depends on how private donors react to the fundraising and “marketing” efforts of 
NGOs whether additional aid funds can be mobilized. Furthermore, donations by well informed 
private donors could render NGO aid more effective by selecting more efficient NGOs. For 
instance, donors could strengthen the development orientation of NGOs by directing donations to 
NGOs with low unproductive overheads and better targeted aid activities. Previous studies on 
NGOs in international development cooperation have hardly addressed these issues as detailed and 
comparable balance sheet data are typically not available for a sufficiently large number of NGOs 
active in this field.  
In this paper, we draw on the registry of US based NGOs provided by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). We combine the balance sheet data available from 
USAID with additional information collected from the NGOs’ own websites. This allows us to 
address several hypotheses on the reactions of private donors to fundraising efforts and relevant 
NGO features. Our focus is on whether donors make informed choices, or are as ignorant as the 
above quote from The Economist suggests. In particular, we assess (i) whether donors give more to 
                                                           
1 See also Werker and Ahmed (2008: Figure 1).  
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specialized NGOs whose activities tend to be better aligned with donor preferences; (ii) whether 
donors prefer NGOs for which a relatively low “price of giving” indicates a strong development 
orientation; and (iii) whether donors tend to be mistaken by possible options to designate private 
donations to specific aid activities, being unaware that designations are binding only under 
exceptional circumstances.  
We perform OLS and 2SLS estimations for a cross-section of more than 500 US based 
NGOs. This implies that we analyze how individual NGOs may attract higher private donations, 
while the question of whether the sum of private donations to all NGOs increases cannot be 
resolved in this way.
2 In Section 2, we derive hypotheses from the related NGO literature. This 
literature is mainly concerned with the activities and financing of NGOs at the local and national 
level. It provides an important analytical background, even though NGOs and private donors appear 
to behave differently across sectors.
3 Section 3 describes in more detail the data and methods 
applied. The empirical results in Section 4 indicate that donors hardly make use of publicly 
available information on NGO characteristics, notably the price of giving and the degree of 
specialization, when deciding on donations. They rather rely on the frequently offered option to 
designate donations to preferred activities. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Analytical background and hypotheses 
While the financing of NGOs in international development cooperation has received only scant 
attention until recently, a much larger literature exists on the intricate links between various revenue 
and expenditure items of NGOs with activities at the local and national level, including arts and 
culture, education and research, health care, and services to the poor. As concerns the mobilization 
of private donations, two issues have been analyzed most thoroughly: the links between official and 
private financing of NGOs, in particular the reaction of private donors to NGO reliance on official 
refinancing, and the effectiveness of fundraising. 
Official refinancing of NGOs may crowd out private donations to the extent that it reduces 
the marginal valuation of the NGO’s charitable output by private donors (Otken and Weisbrod 
2000: 268). On the other hand, official support could be taken by private donors as a signal of 
government approval and social need so that private donations may even be crowded in. The 
                                                           
2 As stressed by Aldashev and Verdier (2010), fundraising efforts by one particular NGO have two effects: diverting 
away donations from other NGOs and increasing the overall pool of donations (by “awakening” or “activating” 
potential new donors). The subsequent analysis does not capture the effects of “awakening” on donations given to 
NGOs other than the NGO that does the fundraising. 
3 For instance, Okten and Weisbrod (2000) find “notable variation across industries” when assessing the determinants of 
donations to national NGO activities such as libraries, art and museums, services to the poor, hospitals, scientific 
research, and higher education. Yi (2010) concludes that fundraising efficiency varies across a similar set of NGO 
activities within the United States.  
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empirical evidence is inconclusive: Official refinancing has crowded in private donations according 
to Otken and Weisbrod (2000), Khanna and Sandler (2000) and Heutel (2010); Payne (1998) and 
Andreoni  and Payne (2003) find crowding out, with official refinancing having indirect effects on 
private donations through weakening the NGOs’ incentives to engage in fundraising. All these 
studies focus on NGOs operating within their home countries. By contrast, Ribar and Wilhelm 
(2002) provide estimates for a small sample of 125 international relief and development 
organizations, finding little evidence for crowding-out in the late 1980s and early 1990s. McCleary 
and Barro (2008: 529) perform some fixed-effects regressions which indicate that official support to 
internationally active NGOs was “a magnet for attracting private funds.”  
Similar to official funds, commercial revenues of NGOs – e.g., from sales – have 
theoretically ambiguous effects on donations (Segal and Weisbrod 1998).
4 On the one hand, donors 
may disapprove of commercial activity by NGOs and reduce their donations accordingly. On the 
other hand, they may honor NGOs’ own efforts to ensure sustainable financing by increasing 
donations. The (limited) empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that commercial 
revenues crowd out donations (Otken and Weisbrod 2000). 
Apart from assessing the links between different types of NGO revenues, the effects of 
fundraising expenditures by NGOs on their revenues from donations have received considerable 
attention. In an earlier theoretical contribution, Rose-Ackerman (1982) presented a model in which 
donors dislike NGOs with high fundraising expenditures. All the same, fundraising per se can be 
expected to be positively related with private donations.
5 Aldashev and Verdier (2010: 52) argue 
that “the fundraising effort of an NGO serves to persuade donors that the NGO’s project is ‘closer’ 
to their preferred dimension of development.” An NGO may thus spend on fundraising to divert 
donations away from other NGOs. Furthermore, fundraising helps increase the overall amount of 
donations to be shared by all NGOs as it “awakens” potential new donors that had not supported 
NGOs before. Previous empirical evidence tends to support this reasoning on positive effects of 
fundraising (Khanna and Sandler 2000; Otken and Weisbrod 2000; Ribar and Wilhelm 2002).
6 
We account for the aforementioned factors in the subsequent analysis. Similar to large parts 
of the literature on local NGOs, however, the present study cannot establish clear causal links 
between fundraising, official refinancing and commercial revenues on the one hand and private 
donations on the other hand. This limitation is particularly serious in studies such as the present one 
                                                           
4 Commercial revenues are termed “private revenues” in the USAID database. These are distinct from (private) 
donations. We use the two terms, commercial and (other) private revenues, interchangeably in the following. 
5 The reasoning refers to the direct effects of fundraising on private donations; see below for indirect effects, i.e., 
fundraising expenditures increasing the price of giving. 
6 However, Song and Yi (2010) find the impact of fundraising by US based NGOs with arts-related activities to be 
“quite low”, unless ticket sales are included as fundraising output.  
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which, for reasons of data availability, are purely cross-sectional. Clearly, fundraising and revenue 
items such as official refinancing cannot be assumed to be exogenous. As a consequence, we 
control for these variables without making strong causal inferences.
7 In any case, it would be hard 
to discriminate between informed and uninformed donor behavior based on their reactions to more 
official refinancing or higher spending on fundraising. For instance, it would be equally rational if 
private donations declined or increased in response to more official refinancing. The first reaction 
could indicate that private donors considered NGOs with more official refinancing to be less needy 
for private support; accordingly, they might shift their donations to NGOs in a more precarious 
financial situation. The second reaction could indicate that donors considered official refinancing to 
be a credible signal of the solidity and development orientation of the NGO so that their donations 
to this NGO were more likely to be used productively. Fundraising per se might be considered 
“excessive” (Rose-Ackerman 1982), or might be valued by donors as providing relevant 
information to be used for better alignment of donor preferences and NGO activity. 
The focus of our analysis is on some more specific hypotheses which allow for a 
straightforward assessment of informed and uninformed donor choices. The first hypothesis relates 
to the so-called efficiency price of NGO activity, or price of giving. Ribar and Wilhelm (2002: 400) 
define the efficiency price as the “reciprocal of the share of service expenditures (total expenditures 
less fund-raising and administrative expenses) in total expenditures.” Private donors are widely 
supposed to dislike NGOs that spend a large share of their revenues for unproductive purposes (e.g., 
Rose-Ackerman 1982).
8 A donated dollar “buys” less charitable output if the proportion of revenues 
spent unproductively on administration, management, and fundraising is relatively high. 
Consequently, informed donors are expected to reduce their donations to NGOs with a higher share 
of unproductive spending.
9 Indeed, when asked what kind of information is most important for 
deciding on donations, about half of survey respondents focus on how NGOs use their revenues 
(Hager et al. 2001).
10 Yet it is open to question whether donors actually incur the cost of collecting 
the information required to make informed choices. 
Search costs may also have implications for the second hypothesis, according to which 
specialized NGOs would attract higher private donations than highly diversified NGOs. The 
                                                           
7 As explained in more detail in Section 3, we mitigate endogeneity concerns related to official refinancing by using 
instruments in 2SLS estimations. However, it proved impossible to find appropriate instruments for fundraising with the 
data available from USAID. 
8 “Unproductive” stands for expenditure items that are not directly related to the NGO’s charitable programs and 
projects; the costs of administration and management as well as expenses for fundraising fall into this category. 
9 Otken and Weisbrod (2000) find this hypothesis supported for US NGOs with local and national activities. However, 
the price of giving as defined by these authors does not account for administration and management costs. 
10 Just 13 percent of respondents state that they focus on an NGO’s reputation. In an earlier survey, more than 80 
percent of respondents rated as important or very important that NGOs spend “an adequate amount  ... for program” 
(Hager et al. 2001: 3).  
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reasoning underlying this hypothesis is as follows. Donors have different preferences concerning 
the NGO activities they would like to support (e.g., Andreoni and Payne 2003). In the case of 
national NGOs, donors may prefer specific types of charitable output such as providing targeted 
services for poor population segments, promoting research and higher education, or supporting arts 
and culture. In the present context of internationally active NGOs, donors may also have 
preferences on where NGOs engage, e.g., in countries that are close-by or which appear to be 
neediest. NGOs competing for donors with certain preferences “try to differentiate the services and 
activities they offer from those of other NGOs” (Aldashev and Verdier 2010: 50). Bilodeau and 
Slivinski (1997) argue that there is a propensity of competing NGOs to specialize in the provision 
of services. These authors derive theoretically that more diversified activities tend to reduce the 
amount of private donations an NGO is able to collect. This is because donors prefer specialized 
NGOs whose activities are best aligned with donor preferences. Donors are expected to be more 
hesitant of giving to “a diversified charity [which] may allocate donations differently than would 
the donors themselves” (Bilodeau and Slivinski 1997: 450). It may seem obvious that “individuals 
like organizations that work on causes they think are important” (Hager et al. 2001: 3). It is a 
different matter, however, if donors actually give more to “organizations that they like.” This 
proposition should hold if, and only if, donors are well informed about the type of activities an 
NGO performs. 
The third hypothesis can also be derived from the important theoretical contribution of 
Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997). Arguably, diversified NGOs may avoid losing private donations 
when offering donors the option to designate how their donations are to be used. Indeed, many US 
NGOs engaged in international development cooperation allow for designations in two respects: 
donors may choose the type of activity and/or the recipient country they want to support (see also 
Section 3 on data and methods).
11 As stressed by Bilodeau and Slivinski, designations of this sort 
are only effective in aligning NGO activities with donor preferences if enough donors actually use 
the option of tying the NGO’s hands. More precisely, the option to designate should induce higher 
donations only if undesignated funds were sufficiently small so that the NGO cannot circumvent 
donor instructions on how to use their donations by allocating undesignated funds according to its 
own preferences. Given that it is typically unknown to donors how large the share of undesignated 
                                                           
11 The type of activity relates to “sectors” of aid (in the jargon of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee), 
e.g., social services such as education and health of economic infrastructure. We use the term “sectoral dimension” in 
the following.  
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funds is, rational donors cannot reasonably be expected to increase their donations simply because 
the NGO offers the option to designate.
12  
 
3.  Data and method 
Most of the data we use to assess whether private donors make informed choices are publicly and 
easily available from the United States Agency for International Development. USAID maintains an 
online registry of US based NGOs with activities in international development cooperation.
13 This 
registry provides recent information on all major revenue items such as official funds, donations, 
and other private revenues. The same applies to expenditure items. In particular, the registry 
differentiates between unproductive expenses for administration and management as well as 
fundraising on the one hand and program and project-related expenses (i.e., the charitable output 
private donors would like to support) on the other hand. This information is presented for 588 
NGOs (as of February 2011), together with their names and some background information 
(including links to websites, etc.).
14 
The data on revenues and expenditures provided in the registry are matched with additional 
information on the portfolio of activities for essentially the same sample of US based NGOs. More 
precisely, it can be identified in which aid sectors and recipient countries each NGO is active.
15 This 
kind of information is important in the present context, as it indicates the degree to which a 
particular NGO is specialized along the geographical and sectoral dimension. Furthermore, we 
collected another set of NGO-specific information by carefully screening NGO websites for 
different options to designate private donations for specific activities. Importantly, we figured out 
which NGO allowed for designations along the geographical and sectoral dimensions for which we 
also have information on the degree of specialization. In this way, it becomes possible to assess 
whether private donors rely on designations mainly as an attempt to tie the hands of more 
diversified NGOs. 
Finally, we draw on some widely used sources for additional control variables, including the 
population of recipient countries and the severity of natural disasters (which are often assumed to 
induce more private giving). Summary statistics are presented in Table 1, while data definitions and 
                                                           
12 Even if the share of undesignated funds were known and small enough, it remains open to question whether NGOs 
could credibly commit themselves to adhere to donor designations ex post. Rational donors would anticipate such time 
inconsistency problems. 
13 See: http://pvo.usaid.gov/usaid/index.html; accessed: February 2011. 
14 The data on revenue and expenditure items used in the empirical analysis come from the 2009 VolAg Report: Report 
of Voluntary Agencies Engaged in Overseas Relief and Development (http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-
cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/volag2009.pdf), which lists 559 NGOs. 
15 It is not reported, however, how much the NGOs spend in particular sectors and countries.  
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sources as well as bivariate correlations are presented in more detail in Appendices A and B. The 
summary statistics reveal some interesting stylized facts on the sample of NGOs: 
  The sample ranges from NGOs that hardly attract any private donations to NGOs with 
several hundred millions of donations. The range is still wider in terms of official 
refinancing and other private revenues. 
  The NGOs in the sample spend, on average, about 14 percent of total expenditures on 
unproductive items, i.e., administration, management and fundraising. The price of giving, 
defined as the inverse of the share of charitable program expenditures in total expenditures, 
varies from one to more than two. 
  The sample includes some highly specialized NGOs with activities in just one recipient 
country or aid sector. At the other extreme, some NGOs report activities in about 20 
recipient countries and, perhaps more surprisingly, more than ten aid sectors. 
  The option to designate is offered by more than one third of all NGOs in the sample. 
Interestingly, the option to choose specific sectors is more common than the option to 
choose specific countries where the donors require the NGO to spend their donations. 
The combination of various sources of NGO-specific data (balance-sheet data, the portfolio 
of activities and options to designate) allows us to empirically assess the hypotheses on informed 
donor reactions to important NGO characteristics introduced in Section 2. However, our approach 
involves one major limitation. The matching of NGO-specific datasets is only possible for one 
particular point in time and cannot be repeated for past years. The subsequent analysis is thus bound 
to be purely cross sectional. This obviously constrains us to account for the possible endogeneity of 
some determinants of private donations. 
For a start, we perform simple OLS estimations. We follow the previous literature and enter 
conventionally used right-hand-side variables in regressions on donations; these include: expenses 
for fundraising (Log expenses for fundraising), the price of giving (Price), official refinancing (Log 
official funds), and other private revenue (Log private revenue). We add some less common control 
variables, inter alia to account for the fact that we deal with NGOs in international development 
cooperation (see below for details). In all estimations, we control for the share of overseas programs 
in overall activities of each NGO (Share of overseas programs).
16 More importantly, we introduce 
two sets of variables in addition to the price of giving in order to test the hypotheses on informed 
donor choices: the degree of NGO specialization along the geographical and sectoral dimension 
(Countries active and Sectors active), and the options to designate donations along the same 
                                                           
16 The average share of overseas programs is almost 80 percent (Table 1).  
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dimensions (Designation option: countries and Designation option: sectors) as well as in other 
dimensions (Designation option: others).
17   
In a second step, we perform 2SLS estimations, mainly to take the potential endogeneity of 
the degree of NGO specialization into account. Intuitively, larger NGOs (i.e., NGOs with higher 
total revenues) tend to be active in more sectors and/or countries. Indeed, looking at simple 
bivariate correlations reveals that NGOs’ total revenues are positively correlated with Countries 
active (rho = 0.25), justifying endogeneity concerns with respect to this variable. By contrast, it 
turns out that larger NGOs do not tend to be active in more sectors. Therefore, endogeneity 
concerns with respect to Sectors active seem less severe. For this reason and in the absence of 
proper instruments for Sectors active, we used an instrument only for Countries active, i.e., the 
average number of countries in the closer neighborhood of the recipient countries in each NGO’s 
portfolio.
18 The underlying idea is that the degree of diversification along the geographical 
dimension is higher if an NGO is active in regions where a large number of countries exist in the 
closer neighborhood. This, in turn, should not have any direct effect on the amount of private 
contributions. Private donors are likely to be indifferent to whether NGOs are active in countries 
with many neighbors.
19 
In an additional specification, we also account for the potential endogeneity of official 
funds. As instruments we use the average voting coincidence in the UN General Assembly between 
the United States and the recipient countries in each NGO’s portfolio, a variable indicating whether 
these recipient countries contributed to the war against Iraq, a country dummy for Qatar, as well as 
sector dummies for "Conflict management", "Food security and food aid", "HIV/AIDS and 
infectious diseases", and "Policy advocacy". We tested for direct effects of these variables on 
private contributions and did not find any significant impact. 
 
4. Results 
We present the OLS results in Table 1. The baseline specification in column (1) includes 
fundraising expenditures as well as official funds and private revenues as major control variables. 
We also account for NGO characteristics such as the relative importance of overseas programs and 
the registration date. To assess whether donor choices are informed, we enter the price of giving 
                                                           
17 The variable Designation option: others captures a heterogeneous variety of options to designate. These options range 
from choices of (just a few or a fairly large number of) specified projects to the possibility to enter self-defined 
preferred activities in a free text field. 
18 The closer neighborhood is defined as comprising countries within the average distance between two countries in the 
world, i.e., about 1,019 kilometers. 
19 In particular, we assume that political considerations (e.g., official donors may be interested in stabilizing a certain 
region where many independent countries exist) do not play a role for private donors.  
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(Price), the degree of specialization along the geographical and sectoral dimension (Countries 
active; Sectors active), and the dummy variable Designation option which equals one if donors 
have the option to designate their donations to particular recipient countries and/or sectors of NGO 
aid. In columns (2) and (3), we extend the list of control variables by selected characteristics of the 
recipient countries of aid from NGOi, the number of other NGOs in the US state where NGOi’s 
headquarter is located, and the fundraising expenditures of other NGOs whose activities overlap 
with those of NGOi.
20 In the next steps, we refine the options to designate donations (sectors, 
countries, or others) in column (4), and account for possible interactions between the option to 
designate and the degree of specialization in column (5). 
The baseline results on our major control variables in column (1) are largely in line with 
previous findings, even though the earlier literature is mainly concerned with NGO activities at the 
local or national level. Higher expenses for fundraising by NGOi are clearly associated with higher 
donations, at the one percent level of significance. The positive correlations of official funds and 
private revenues with donations point to complementarities and are in conflict with crowding-out 
effects. Both correlations are significant at the one percent level, although the size of the coefficient 
of Log official funds is fairly small. As noted in Section 2, official funds tend to crowd in donations 
to the extent that private donors regard the former as the government’s approval of NGOi’s financial 
solidity and development orientation. Likewise, it appears that private donors honor financial self-
help by NGOs, rather than redirecting donations to NGOs without commercial activities. 
NGOs receive higher donations if overseas programs account for a higher share in total 
expenditures, and if NGOs have registered with USAID in the more distant past. The latter finding 
may reflect that NGOs which are more experienced and better known collect higher donations than 
peers which registered more recently. This appears to be in some conflict with the survey results 
noted in Section 2, according to which donors claimed to focus on NGOs’ program spending rather 
than their reputation or visibility (Hager et al. 2001). Indeed, unproductive spending as reflected in 
                                                           
20 More precisely, the fundraising overlap of NGO i with the other NGOs along the sectoral and geographical dimension 
is defined as follows:            	          
∑          	   	            ∗	
	                          
       	                  
     
   
               where Expenses 
for Fundraisingj are the expenses for fundraising of NGO j, Sectors(Countries)activeij is the number of sectors 
(countries) in which both NGOs i and j are active, Sectors(Countries)activej is the total number of sectors (countries) in 
which NGO j is active, and Populationi is the total population of the countries in which NGO i is active (The weighting 
with population is only applied to the fundraising overlap along the geographical dimension). 
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Price is not significantly correlated with donations, while it carries the negative sign to be expected 
if well informed donors preferred NGOs using revenues more productively.  
The results on the degree of NGO specialization cast further into doubt that donors make use 
of available information in order to give to NGOs whose activities are more likely to be aligned 
with donor preferences. A stronger specialization along the sectoral dimension (Sectors active) has 
no significant impact on the amount of donations. A stronger specialization along the geographical 
dimension (Countries active) even appears to be associated with significantly lower donations. 
While this finding seems to be in sharp contrast to the proposition of informed donors favoring 
specialized NGOs, it can be attributed to the endogeneity of Countries active (see below). 
Turning to the available options of giving, the possibility to donate online is negatively 
correlated with the amount of donations, whereas the possibility to donate periodically is positively 
correlated.
21 However, both dummy variables fail to pass conventional significance levels. Most 
strikingly, the option to tie the NGO’s hands on how to spend the donation is associated with a 
higher amount of donations, at the five percent level of significance. This suggests that the donors 
trust in the binding character of this easy option, available at almost zero costs of information. This 
belief may even explain why donors seem to see no need to collect relevant information on the 
areas of specialization of the NGO in order to allocate donations according to their own preferences 
and priorities. However, such a behavior could hardly be considered rational, recalling that the 
designation option becomes meaningless as long as the NGO is able to allocate undesignated funds 
so as to offset the effect of any designations (Bilodeau and Slivinski 1997: 461). 
The baseline results are hardly affected when extending the specification by additional 
control variables in columns (2) and (3).  We include the number of people affected by disasters in 
NGOi’s country portfolio as well as the population in the largest country where  NGOi is active, 
mainly to check whether the above noted positive relationship between the number of recipient 
countries and private donations is robust. This positive relationship could be an indirect result of 
geographically diversified NGOs receiving higher donations because of disasters in countries where 
they are active. The likelihood of an NGO being confronted with disasters in countries within its 
portfolio obviously increases with the degree of diversification along the geographical dimension 
(and with the size of the recipient countries). Nevertheless, the coefficient of Countries active 
decreases just slightly in size and remains highly significant after controlling for this factor. At the 
same time, NGOs active in more populous countries, on which donor attention may concentrate, 
                                                           
21 The negative coefficient of the dummy variable for online donations is fairly surprising. The large majority of NGOs 
in our sample offers this option. The explanation could be that those NGOs not offering the online option receive 
particularly large donations from just one or a few private donors (e.g., foundations financed by wealthy 
philanthropists).  
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attract higher donations. The coefficient of Log population (max) is positive and significant at the 
one percent level. The coefficient of the number of people affected by disasters is negative, though 
significant at the ten percent level only in column (2). This appears to contradict the view that 
private donors routinely react to disasters by giving more. However, Log population (max) and Log 
people affected by disasters are highly (positively) correlated giving rise to multicollinearity 
concerns.
22 
The additional control variables introduced in column (3) do not affect donations in a 
significant way. Yet, the results on fundraising expenses by other NGOs with a similar portfolio of 
activities as NGOi are interesting to note. Independent of whether the overlap of portfolios relates to 
the geographical dimension (Log fundraising overlap (countries)) or the sectoral dimension (Log 
fundraising overlap (sectors)) it appears that two opposing effects cancel out each other: the 
diversion of donations away from NGOi, and the “awakening” of new donors from which NGOi 
benefits even though the fundraising is done by peers with similar activities (Aldashev and Verdier 
2010). 
Finally, we refine the designation option. In column (4) we enter separate dummy variables 
set equal to one if the donor can designate along the sectoral dimension (Designation option: 
sectors) and, respectively, the geographical dimension (Designation option: countries). It turns out 
that the previous finding of donations reacting positively to the option to designate is attributable 
exclusively to the sectoral dimension, while the dummy variable capturing the geographical 
dimension does not pass conventional significance levels. There is no obvious reason to believe that 
designations are more effective in tying the NGOs’ hands when using the sectoral option. It rather 
appears that donors have relatively weak preferences on geographical spending patterns compared 
to sectoral spending patterns. 
The coefficient of Designation option: sectors is no longer significant at conventional levels 
when also accounting for the interaction of this dummy variable with the degree of specialization 
(along the sectoral dimension) in column (5). However, the interaction has no significant impact 
either. The same applies to the corresponding interaction between designations and specialization 
along the geographical dimension. This is no longer surprising: Significant interaction terms would 
imply that donors valued the option to designate in order to better align their preferences with the 
activities of more diversified NGOs. As noted before, however, donors appear to be unaware that 
diversified NGOs are less likely to spend in line with donor preferences. 
                                                           
22 Nonetheless, we opt to include both variables as the hypotheses behind these variables are distinct.  
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In Table 2 we replicate the extended OLS specifications in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 
by performing 2SLS regressions.
23 As noted in Section 3, we are mainly interested to control for the 
possible endogeneity of one of our variables of principal interest, the degree of NGO specialization 
along the geographical dimension. All four estimations reported in Table 2 use as an instrument the 
average number of countries in the closer neighborhood of the recipient countries in each NGO’s 
portfolio. The instrument proves to be relevant: the coefficient in the first stage regression turns out 
to be significant at the one percent level and of expected sign. The F-test of excluding instruments 
shows a value of 17.2 which is clearly above the critical rule of thumb value of 10 (column 1).  In 
addition, we use instruments for Log official funds, which represents one of the major control 
variables, in columns (2) and (4). 
The results for most of the control variables are hardly affected when performing 2SLS 
estimations instead of OLS estimations. There is one important exception, however. The coefficient 
of Log official funds loses its significance once we also use instruments for this control variable.
24 It 
appears that the above noted crowding-in effects of official funds are not robust. As discussed in 
Section 2, official refinancing may crowd out private donations - either directly when donors dislike 
official NGO financing and reduce their giving or redirect it to needier NGOs, or indirectly by 
weakening the NGOs’ incentives to engage in fundraising. According to the results reported in 
columns (2) and (4) of Table 2, the opposing effects of official refinancing on private donations 
tend to cancel out each other. 
As for our variables of principal interest, the coefficient of Price increases considerably in 
size (in absolute terms). However, it still fails to meet conventional significance levels, which 
underscores the previous conclusion that private donors do not strongly prefer NGOs whose 
spending patterns point to a more productive use of revenues. The instrumentation renders 
Countries active statistically insignificant. Importantly, this does not alter the previous conclusion 
that donors make no use of available information on the degree of NGO specialization in order to 
reduce the risk that the allocation of NGO funds is misaligned with donor preferences. Both 
dimensions of NGO specialization now resemble each other in that donations are unaffected. The 
findings for the options to designate are largely as before in the OLS estimations.
25 Once again, the 
general option to designate as well as the option to choose specific sectors has a significant and 
                                                           
23 It proved impossible to replicate the OLS estimation with the interaction terms in column (5) of Table 1. This would 
have required additional instrumental variables. Given that the interaction terms proved to be insignificant before 
already, it is unlikely that we miss any relevant insights from being unable to replicate this extended specification. 
24 It may also be noted that the coefficient of Log population (max) increases considerably in size, while the 
significance level deteriorates to the 10 percent level. 
25 The option for online donations (of any type) represents a minor exception. The coefficient of this dummy variable is 
negative as before, but now even significant at the 10 percent level.  
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positive effect on the amount of donations, contrary to what the assumption of rational and well-
informed donors would suggest.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Private donations could not only scale up NGO aid. At the same time, well informed donors could 
render NGO aid more effective. By selecting NGOs with lower “unproductive” expenses, donors 
could strengthen the development orientation of NGOs; by giving to more specialized NGOs, 
donors could improve the targeting of NGO aid and better align NGO activities with donor 
priorities. We combine several publicly available sources of NGO-specific data to empirically 
assess the determinants of private donations across a large sample of US based NGOs engaged in 
international development cooperation. 
OLS and 2SLS estimations indicate that donors hardly make use of easily accessible 
information on relevant NGO characteristics, notably the “price of giving” and the degree of 
specialization, when deciding on donations. They rather rely on the frequently offered option to 
designate donations to preferred activities. In particular, they attempt to tie the NGOs’ hands by 
obliging them to use donations in preferred sectors of aid – even though this behavior would be 
rational only under conditions that are highly unlikely to hold. 
Clearly, the present analysis does not support general verdicts, as quoted in the beginning, 
on private donors refusing to be freed from their ignorance. Even though most of the information 
required for informed choices is easily available online, collecting them still involves search costs 
that rational donors may prefer to avoid when deciding on donations. Nevertheless, one may 
deplore that donors are no more engaged in assessing important NGO characteristics in order to 
identify NGOs performing targeted activities in efficient ways, allocate donations to these NGOs, 
and thereby render NGO aid more effective. Life appears to be relatively easy for NGOs trying to 
attract donations – at least as long donors follow a red herring by taking the simple option of ticking 
a box. 
The monitoring of NGOs in international development cooperation could perhaps be 
strengthened if NGOs were required to provide information on the share of undesignated 
expenditures and how these are spend, compared to the geographical and sectoral priorities of 
donors using the option to designate. Individual donors may not refer to such information either for 
making more informed choices. However, NGO watchdogs probably would – and their improved 
monitoring may at least indirectly reduce public ignorance and NGO opacity. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Private contributions 559 12,700,000 41,000,000 500 478,000,000
Expenses for fundraising 559 1,614,580 6,876,399 0 88,100,000
Price 559 1.2 0.2 1.0 2.3
Registration date 543 1997 10 1977 2009
Official funds 559 11,800,000 60,800,000 0 1,130,000,000
Private revenue 559 8,511,858 99,700,000 -33,480 2,300,000,000
Share of overseas programs 559 77.6 33.6 0 100
Countries active 524 8.4 5.6 1 21
Sectors active 524 8.1 2.8 1 14
Designation option 559 0.4 0.5 0 1
Designation option: sectors 559 0.2 0.4 0 1
Designation option: countries 559 0.1 0.3 0 1
Designation option: others 559 0.2 0.4 0 1
Periodical donation possible 556 0.5 0.5 0 1
Online donation possible 555 0.8 0.4 0 1
Number of people affected by disasters 524 60,900,000 91,200,000 0 299,000,000
Population (max) 524 510,000,000 549,000,000 838,699 1,320,000,000
Fundraising overlap (countries; weighted by population) 524 0.5 0.7 0.0 5.3
Fundraising overlap (sectors) 524 223,000,000 86,800,000 0 403,000,000
NGO density (US state) 543 42 33 1 94
Countries in the closer neighborhood 522 5.5 2.3 1.0 20.0
UN voting 524 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.80
Contributions to war against Iraq 517 0.1 0.1 0 1
Country dummy: Qatar 559 0.0 0.1 0 1
Sector dummy: "Conflict Management" 559 0.1 0.3 0 1
Sector dummy: "Food security and food aid" 559 0.2 0.4 0 1
Sector dummy: "HIV/AIDS and Infectious Diseases" 559 0.4 0.5 0 1
Sector dummy: "Policy Advocacy" 559 0.1 0.3 0 1 
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Table 2: Determinants of private donations: OLS results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log expenses for fundraising 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.170*** 0.170***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Price -0.077 -0.196 -0.276 -0.250 -0.251
(0.434) (0.424) (0.421) (0.424) (0.424)
Registration date -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log official funds 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.036***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Log private revenue 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Share of overseas programs 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Countries active 0.060*** 0.047*** 0.041** 0.039** 0.036**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Sectors active 0.027 0.028 0.019 0.022 0.021
(0.022) (0.022) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Designation option 0.298** 0.276** 0.299**
(0.131) (0.132) (0.133)
Designation option: sectors 0.491*** 0.444
(0.145) (0.477)
Design. option: sectors * Sectors active 0.004
(0.054)
Designation option: countries 0.056 -0.380
(0.201) (0.546)
Design. option: countries * Countries active 0.038
(0.042)
Designation option: others 0.234 0.229
(0.192) (0.193)
Periodical donation possible 0.201 0.190 0.177 0.176 0.179
(0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140)
Online donation possible -0.303 -0.286 -0.327 -0.321 -0.317
(0.210) (0.209) (0.217) (0.216) (0.217)
Log people affected by disasters -0.054* -0.053 -0.053 -0.052
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Log population (max) 0.183*** 0.237** 0.238** 0.241**
(0.062) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Log fundraising overlap (countries) 0.075 0.074 0.072
(0.098) (0.097) (0.097)
Log fundraising overlap (sectors) 0.066 0.026 0.038
(0.226) (0.230) (0.231)
NGO density (US state) 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 69.481*** 64.586*** 63.796*** 64.193*** 64.005***
(14.793) (14.438) (15.130) (15.118) (15.079)
Observations 518 518 517 517 517
R-squared 0.633 0.640 0.641 0.644 0.644
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Determinants of private donations: 2SLS results 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log expenses for fundraising 0.187*** 0.194*** 0.183*** 0.189***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019)
Price -0.459 -0.587 -0.402 -0.533
(0.453) (0.431) (0.448) (0.426)
Registration date -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.035***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Log official funds 0.038*** 0.040 0.039*** 0.032
(0.011) (0.046) (0.011) (0.044)
Log private revenue 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.139***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
Share of overseas programs 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Countries active -0.049 -0.070 -0.045 -0.059
(0.085) (0.082) (0.084) (0.077)
Sectors active 0.033 0.051 0.036 0.056
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Designation option 0.330** 0.351**
(0.141) (0.138)
Designation option: sectors 0.545*** 0.562***
(0.161) (0.168)
Designation option: countries 0.132 0.143
(0.224) (0.220)
Designation option: others 0.228 0.236
(0.188) (0.192)
Periodical donation possible 0.142 0.137 0.147 0.140
(0.144) (0.141) (0.143) (0.140)
Online donation possible -0.452* -0.483* -0.439* -0.466*
(0.264) (0.257) (0.260) (0.252)
Log people affected by disasters -0.031 0.025 -0.033 0.024
(0.039) (0.047) (0.038) (0.046)
Log population (max) 0.456* 0.455* 0.441* 0.418*
(0.237) (0.246) (0.232) (0.231)
Log fundraising overlap (countries) 0.258 0.310 0.244 0.278
(0.215) (0.224) (0.211) (0.211)
Log fundraising overlap (sectors) 0.022 -0.060 -0.017 -0.111
(0.224) (0.229) (0.226) (0.230)
NGO density (US state) 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 73.930*** 71.959*** 74.128*** 74.974***
(18.016) (22.317) (18.077) (21.839)
Observations 515 510 515 510
R-squared 0.618 0.609 0.624 0.619
F-test of excluded instruments
     Countries active 17.23 5.37 17.69 5.30
     Official funds (logged) 10.13 10.40
Hansen test (p-value) 0.63 0.62
Notes: (1) and (3) Instrument for Countries active: Average number of countries in the closer
neighborhood; (2) and (4) Instruments for Log officialfunds: UNvoting, contributions to waragainst
Iraq, country dummy: Qatar, sector dummies: "Conflict Management", "Food security and food aid",
"HIV/AIDSand Infectious Diseases", "Policy Advocacy"; robust standard errors in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A: Definition of variables and sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
Private contributions  Contributions from private donors; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report, 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-
cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperati
on/volag2009.pdf 
Expenses for fundraising  Fundraising costs; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Price  Price of giving; defined as the inverse of the share of service expenditures (total 
expenditures less fund-raising and administrative expenses) in total expenditures; 
2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Registration date  Year of registration at USAID's Registry of private voluntary organizations 
(PVOs) 
USAID, 
http://pvo.usaid.gov/usaid/pvo.asp?All=YES&
INCVOLAG=YES&INCSUM=YES 
Official funds  Official funding of NGOs; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Private revenue  Private revenue of NGOs; 2007  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Share of overseas programs  Expenses of NGOs for foreign programs as a share of total expenses; in percent; 
2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Countries active  Number of countries in which the NGO is active  http://www.pvo.net/usaid/index.html 
(accessed: May 2010) 
Sectors active  Number of  sectors in which the NGO is active  http://www.pvo.net/usaid/index.html 
Designation option  Dummy variable equal to one if the NGO offers the possibility to private donors 
to designate their donations 
NGOs' own web pages 
Designation option: sectors  Dummy variable equal to one if the NGO offers the possibility to private donors 
to designate their donations to a specific sector 
NGOs' own web pages 
Designation option: countries  Dummy variable equal to one if the NGO offers the possibility to private donors 
to designate their donations to a specific country 
NGOs' own web pages 
Designation option: others  Dummy variable equal to one if the NGO offers the possibility to private donors 
to designate their donations to a specific project (from its name the sector and the 
country cannot be inferred) or to enter self-defined preferred activities in a free 
text field 
NGOs' own web pages 
Periodical donation possible  Dummy variable equal to one if periodical donations on the NGO's web page are 
possible (e.g., annually, monthly, …) 
NGOs' own web pages 
Online donation possible  Dummy variable equal to one if online donations are possible  NGOs' own web pages 
Number of people affected by disasters  Number of people affected by disasters in the recipient countries of the NGO's 
portfolio; 2006 and 2007 
EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International 
Disaster Database, www.emdat.be, Université 
Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium 
Population (max)  Maximum population of a recipient country in the NGO's country portfolio  World Bank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do  
 
20
(accessed: June 2010) 
Fundraising overlap (countries; weighted by 
population) 
Fundraising expenditures of other NGOs whose countries overlap with those of 
NGO i (weighted by population); 2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report, World Bank  
Fundraising overlap (sectors)  Fundraising expenditures of other NGOs whose sectors overlap with those of 
NGO i; 2007 
USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
NGO density (US state)  Number of other NGOs in the US state where NGOi’s headquarter is located  USAID 2009 VolAg Report 
Countries in the closer neighborhood  The average number of countries in the closer neighborhood of the recipient 
countries in the NGO’s portfolio. The closer neighborhood is defined as 
comprising countries within the average distance between two countries in the 
world, i.e., about 1,019 kilometers. 
The CEPII Databases, 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/bdd.htm 
 
UN voting  The average voting coincidence in the UN General Assembly between the United 
States and the recipient countries in each NGO’s portfolio; only those votes are 
counted which are considered "key votes" by the US Department of State; 
average over 2004-2006 
Dreher and Sturm (2010) 
Contributions to war against Iraq  Variable indicating whether the recipient countries in the NGO's portfolio 
contributed to the war against Iraq 
Iraq Year in Review: 2004 Fact Sheet, U.S. 
Department of Defense, January 2005, 
www.defense.gov 
Country dummy: Qatar  Dummy equal to one if the NGO is active in Qatar  http://www.pvo.net/usaid/index.html 
Sector dummy: "Conflict Management"  Dummy equal to one if the NGO is active in the sector "Conflict Management"  http://www.pvo.net/usaid/index.html 
Sector dummy: "Food security and food aid"  Dummy equal to one if the NGO is active in the sector "Food security and food 
aid" 
http://www.pvo.net/usaid/index.html 
Sector dummy: "HIV/AIDS and Infectious 
Diseases" 
Dummy equal to one if the NGO is active in the sector "HIV/AIDS and Infectious 
Diseases" 
http://www.pvo.net/usaid/index.html 
Sector dummy: "Policy Advocacy"  Dummy equal to one if the NGO is active in the sector "Policy Advocacy" http://www.pvo.net/usaid/index.html 
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Appendix B: Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
(1) Private contributions 1.00
(2) Expenses for fundraising 0.62 1.00
(3) Price 0.00 0.15 1.00
(4) Registration date -0.46 -0.21 0.12 1.00
(5) Official funds 0.41 0.20 -0.03 -0.39 1.00
(6) Private revenue 0.62 0.39 0.00 -0.43 0.38 1.00
(7) Share of overseas programs 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.15 1.00
(8) Countries active 0.51 0.32 -0.05 -0.37 0.29 0.42 0.00 1.00
(9) Sectors active 0.13 0.06 -0.05 -0.11 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.13 1.00
(10) Designation option 0.21 0.15 -0.16 -0.13 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.08 1.00
(11) Designation option: sectors 0.26 0.22 -0.12 -0.11 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.19 0.12 0.56 1.00
(12) Designation option: countries 0.18 0.15 -0.12 -0.06 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.39 0.26 1.00
(13) Designation option: others -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.57 -0.21 -0.15 1.00
(14) Periodical donation possible 0.21 0.28 -0.08 -0.12 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.06 0.11 1.00
(15) Online donation possible 0.20 0.35 -0.06 -0.12 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.35 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.44 1.00
(16) Number of people affected by disasters 0.34 0.17 -0.02 -0.19 0.17 0.26 -0.01 0.59 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.14 -0.02 0.09 0.07 1.00
(17) Population (max) 0.40 0.22 0.02 -0.24 0.18 0.33 -0.02 0.60 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.16 -0.03 0.09 0.07 0.83 1.00
(18) Fundraising overlap (countries; weighted by population) -0.24 -0.11 -0.03 0.13 -0.12 -0.18 -0.01 -0.30 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.61 -0.82 1.00
(19) Fundraising overlap (sectors) 0.09 0.07 -0.13 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.09 0.84 0.09 0.16 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.05 1.00
(20) NGO density (US state) 0.12 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.23 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.11 1.00
(21) Countries in the closer neighborhood -0.09 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.12 -0.10 -0.32 -0.33 0.34 -0.010 . 0 61 . 0 0
(22) UN voting -0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.27 -0.26 0.39 -0.02 -0.03 0.49 1.00
(23) Contributions to war against Iraq -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.30 0.33 1.00
(24) Country dummy: Qatar 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.14 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.05 1.00
(25) Sector dummy: "Conflict Management" -0.04 -0.08 0.09 0.04 0.14 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.10 -0.02 1.00
(26) Sector dummy: "Food security and food aid" 0.03 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.26 0.07 0.18 0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.12 0.29 -0.07 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 1.00
(27) Sector dummy: "HIV/AIDS and Infectious Diseases" 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.36 -0.03 -0.04 -0.18 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.09 1.00
(28) Sector dummy: "Policy Advocacy" 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.21 0.08 -0.15 0.07 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.14 0.02 0.22 0.03 -0.02 0.14 0.07 0.19 -0.08 -0.07 1.00